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This study investigates corporate environmentalism in a managerial delegation contract and 
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1. Introduction 
Since Porter (1991) and Porter and Van der Linde (1995) challenged the traditional view on the 
relationship between environmental regulation and competitiveness by suggesting that a well-
designed regulation may enhance business profitability, there has been a growing interest in 
corporate environmentalism in recent business and economics literature.1 However, most of the 
literature on the analysis of theoretical and empirical studies assumes a green-premium in prices, 
where firms’ investments in emission abatement technologies lead to productivity gains.2 In 
contrast, we construct a mechanism through which profits increase under the incentive subsidy 
on abatement technologies, which induces polluting firms’ strategic concerns for environmental 
corporate social responsibility (ECSR) to be socially desirable. This allows us to investigate the 
Porter’s concept of environmental policy and business profitability. 
We consider two cases of corporate environmentalism in a managerial delegation model. In the 
process of ECSR, firms can reduce emissions by decreasing their outputs or by investing in 
abatement technologies (or both). We first consider the former case, in which each polluting 
                                          
1 In the recent literature of instrumental environmental corporate social responsibility, Lambertini and 
Tampieri (2015), Liu et al. (2015), Hirose et al. (2017) and Lee and Park (2017) explained how ECSR is 
desirable for both firms and society. However, they emphasized the voluntary aspect of corporate 
environmentalism without considering the relationship between environmental regulation and industry 
competitiveness. 
2 See, for example, Ambec, et al. (2013) and the references therein. 
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firm decides its ECSR without abatement technologies, and a firm can reduce its emissions 
voluntarily by output reduction. In this case, we note a cost pass-through effect, under which a 
portion of the increased cost can be reflected in consumer prices, which is profitable to the firms. 
We also consider the latter case, in which each firm purchases abatement goods from the eco-
industry under the incentive subsidy. We then show that a well-designed government subsidy on 
abatement technologies can induce polluting firms’ strategic ECSR behaviors to be socially 
desirable. Hence, we conclude that welfare-improving alignment between private and social 
incentives is feasible, given an incentive subsidy scheme on voluntary self-regulation. 
2. The Basic Model 
We consider the following quasi linear utility function of the representative consumer, suggested 
by Singh and Vives (1984): 
ܷሺݍଵ, ݍଶሻ ൌ ܣሺݍଵ ൅ ݍଶሻ െ ൫௤భ
మାଶఉ௤భ௤మା௤మమ൯
ଶ                                         ( 1 ) 
where ߚ ∈ ሺ0, 1ሻ denotes the degree of product differentiation. The inverse demand function is 
linear: 
௜ܲ ൌ ܣ െ ݍ௜ െ ߚݍ௝ , ݅ ൌ 1,2	and	݅ ് ݆.                                       (2) 
where ௜ܲ and ݍ௜ are firm ݅’s price and quantity, respectively.  
Both firms emit the same pollutants, but they can reduce their emission levels by purchasing 
abatement goods, ܽ௜, produced in the eco-industry. We assume an end-of-pipe technology, in 
which an emission function is linear,3 
݁௜ሺݍ௜, ܽ௜ሻ ൌ ݍ௜ െ ܽ௜  ሺ3ሻ 
We also assume that the damage function is quadratic: 
ܦ ൌ ݀ሺ෌ ݁௜ሺݍ௜, ܽ௜ሻଶ௜ୀଵ ሻଶ  ሺ4ሻ 
where d (> 0) is the coefficient of the environmental damage function. 
We consider a managerial delegation model,4 in which each firm consists of an owner who 
                                          
3 The reduction in gross emissions simplifies the analytical treatment because there is no interaction term 
between the outputs and the abatement goods. For a justification of this type of technology, see David and 
Sinclair-Desgagne (2005), Poyago-Theotoky (2007) , Canton et al. (2008), and Lee and Park (2011, 2017). 
4 Fershtman (1985) and Sklivas (1987) provided seminal papers on the managerial delegation game. 
Later, Lee and Park (2017) and Poyago-Theotoky and Yong (2017) applied this game to corporate 
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owns the firm and a manager who makes decisions based on the incentive contract designed by 
the corresponding firm owner. In particular, following Lee and Park (2017) and Hirose et al. 
(2017), the pay-off function of the manager of the polluting firm is: 
௜ܶ ൌ ߨ௜ െ ߠ௜݀ሺݍ௜ െ ܽ௜ሻଶ  ሺ5ሻ 
where ߨ௜  is firm i’s profit and ߠ௜  (൒ 0) is the internal emission price on the damage it 
produced, which represents the degree of ECSR, as determined by the owner of firm ݅. Note 
that each manager’s compensation structure is proportional to a linear combination of profit and 
the ECSR incentive.  
Without loss of generality, we assume that each firm’s marginal production cost is zero and the 
unit price of abatement goods in the eco-industry is given by ݎ. Further, we assume that the 
firm can receive a subsidy from government when it engages in abatement technologies, that is, 
when the firm decides to purchase abatement goods from eco-firms (ܽ௜ ൐ 0). Here, we assume 
that the subsidy is nonlinear and is a function of both firms’ degrees of ECSR, ௜ܵ ൌ ௜ܵሺߠ௜, ߠ௝ሻ. 
This implies that when the owner decides to adopt ECSR (i.e., when ߠ௜ ൐ 0), she also decides 
whether to engage in abatement technologies at the management level, after observing the 
government’s subsidy policy. Hence, the owner of firm ݅ maximizes the following firm’s 
profit5: 
ߨ௜ ൌ ௜ܲݍ௜ when it decides not to adopt abatement technologies (ܽ௜ ൌ 0)                ሺ6ሻ 
ߨ௜ ൌ ௜ܲݍ௜ െ ݎܽ௜ ൅ ௜ܵሺߠ௜, ߠ௝ሻ when it decides to adopt abatement technologies (ܽ௜ ൐ 0)    ሺ7ሻ 
In the eco-industry, we consider a Cournot oligopoly where ݉ሺ൒ 1ሻ eco-firms compete in 
producing abatement goods. The profit function of each eco-firm is: 
ߨ௘ ൌ ݎሺܽாሻܽ௘                                                 ( 8 ) 
where ܽ௘  is the individual production of each eco-firm and ܽா ൌ ∑ ܽ௘௠௘ୀଵ  is the total 
production of abatement goods. Following the market equilibrium approach in David (2005) 
and Canton et al. (2008), we assume that the market price of abatement goods is determined by 
the total demand of the polluting firms and the total supply of the eco-firms. That is, we have 
                                                                                                                         
environmentalism. 
5 Note that we also have ܽ௜ ൌ 0 when ߠ௜ ൌ 0 because purchasing abatement goods causes a cost 
without increasing revenue in the profit function in (6). Lemma 1 shows that the option of implementing 
no ECSR (ߠ௜ ൌ 0) is not an equilibrium. 
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ܽா ൌ ∑ ܽ௘௠௘ୀଵ ൌ ∑ ܽ௜ଶ௜ୀଵ  at market equilibrium. 
The timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage, the government announces a subsidy 
plan for polluting firms, which engage in abatement technologies. In the second stage, after 
observing the subsidy plan, the owner of each polluting firm decides on a degree of ECSR and 
whether to adopt abatement technologies to maximize the firm’s profit. The subsidy is only 
provided when the firm adopts abatement technologies, and is based on the degree of ECSR. If 
a subsidy is provided, then in the third stage, the eco-firm produces its abatement goods to 
maximize its own profit, expecting that the market price will be determined by total demand and 
total supply of the eco-industry. In the fourth stage, each polluting firm chooses its price and, if 
the owner decides to adopt abatement technologies, purchases abatement goods to maximize its 
own payoff function. All games are solved by backward induction. 
3. The Analysis 
3.1 Equilibrium without abatement goods (ܽ௜ ൌ 0) 
We first examine the equilibrium without abatement goods. If the owner of polluting firm 
decides to adopt ECSR without engaging in abatement technologies, then the manager of the 
firm maximizes the objective function in (6) with ܽ௜ ൌ 0 in the fourth stage. Then, the first 
order conditions yield the following reaction functions: 
௜ܲሺ ௝ܲ; ߠ௜, ߠ௝ሻ ൌ ൫஺ሺଵିఉሻାఉ௉ೕ൯൫ଵିఉ
మାଶௗఏ೔൯
ଶሺଵିఉమାௗఏ೔ሻ                                     (9) 
This implies that the increase in ECSR can be carried over to increase in prices and thus, each 
firm has an incentive to adopt ECSR by restricting its output (i.e., there is an output-restriction 
effect).6 Then, the equilibrium outcomes in the fourth stage are: 
௜ܲைሺߠ௜, ߠ௝ሻ ൌ ஺ሺଵିఉ
మାଶௗఏ೔ሻሺଶିఉିఉమାଶௗఏೕሻ
ସିହఉమାఉరାଶௗሺଶିఉమሻఏೕାଶௗఏ೔ሺଶିఉమାଶௗఏೕሻ                            (10) 
ݍ௜ைሺߠ௜, ߠ௝ሻ ൌ ஺൫ଶିఉିఉ
మାଶௗఏೕ൯
ସିହఉమାఉరାଶௗሺଶିఉమሻఏೕାଶௗఏ೔൫ଶିఉమାଶௗఏೕ൯                            (11) 
ߨ௜ைሺߠ௜, ߠ௝ሻ ൌ ஺
మ൫ଵିఉమାଶௗఏ೔൯൫ଶିఉିఉమାଶௗఏೕ൯మ
ቀସିହఉమାఉరାଶௗሺଶିఉమሻఏೕାଶௗఏ೔൫ଶିఉమାଶௗఏೕ൯ቁ
మ                             (12) 
                                          
6 Firms can reduce emissions by investing in abatement technologies or by decreasing their output (or 
both). The latter case of the output-restriction effect of ECSR is pointed out by Lee and Park (2017) and 
Hirose et al. (2017). 
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In the second stage, the first order conditions for maximizing profit in (12) with respect to the 
degree of ECSR yield the following reaction functions:7 
ߠ௜൫ߠ௝൯ ൌ ఉ
మ൫ଵିఉమାଶௗఏೕ൯
ଶௗ൫ଶିఉమାଶௗఏೕ൯                                             (13)  
This implies that the choices of ECSR are strategic complements and thus, there exists a cost 
pass-through effect, under which a portion of the increased cost can be reflected in consumer 
prices. That is, the firm can increase the equilibrium prices when it increases its ECSR because 
its rival firm also increases its own ECSR. 
Finally, we have the equilibrium outcomes without abatement goods as follows: 
ߠ௜ை ൌ ඥଵିఉ
మିሺଵିఉమሻ
ଶௗ , ݍ௜ை ൌ
஺
ଵାఉାඥଵିఉమ , ௜ܲ
ை ൌ ஺ඥଵିఉమଵାఉାඥଵିఉమ , ߨ௜ை ൌ
஺మඥଵିఉమ
ሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻమ , 
ܧܦை ൌ ସ஺మௗሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻమ and ܹை ൌ ܥܵ ൅ ߨଵ ൅ ߨଶ െ ED ൌ
஺మቀଵିଶௗାఉାଶඥଵିఉమቁ
ቀଵାఉାඥଵିఉమቁమ
 . 
Lemma 1. In the managerial delegation model, voluntary ECSR is always profitable even 
though it does not adopt abatement technologies. 
Proof. If the owner of polluting firm doesn’t adopt ECSR, the objective function of the manager 
is the same with the profit in (6). Then, the equilibrium outcomes are: ௜ܲே ൌ ஺ሺଵିఉሻଶିఉ  , 
ݍ௜ே ൌ ஺ሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻ		and ߨ௜ே ൌ
஺మሺଵିఉሻ
ሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉሻ. Thus, ߨ௜ை ൐ ߨ௜ே	for	ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ. Q.E.D. 
3.2 Equilibrium with abatement goods (ܽ௜ ൐ 0). 
If the owner of the polluting firm decides to adopt both ECSR and abatement technologies, the 
firm can receive the subsidy from the government and thus, its profit function is given as in (7). 
In what follows, we construct an incentive subsidy scheme to induce polluting firms to engage 
in abatement technologies. We then show that an incentive subsidy scheme can induce polluting 
firms’ strategic ECSR behaviors to be socially desirable. 
Each firm is free to choose whether to engage in abatement technologies, and decides to do so if 
and only if this will lead to a higher profit than under no abatement goods, given the degree of 
ECSR. That is, when the owner of a firm decides whether to adopt abatement technologies in 
the second stage, the following inequality is a sufficient incentive compatibility condition for 
                                          
7 The third stage of choosing market equilibrium prices is not relevant in this game of no abatement 
goods. 
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both firms to choose abatement technologies: 
ߨ௜൫ߠ௜; ߠ௝൯ ൌ ௜ܲݍ௜ െ ݎܽ௜ ൅ ௜ܵ൫ߠ௜, ߠ௝൯ ൒ ߨ௜ைሺߠ௜, ߠ௝ሻ                                  (14) 
or 
௜ܵ൫ߠ௜, ߠ௝൯ ൒ ߨ௜ைሺߠ௜, ߠ௝ሻ െ ௜ܲݍ௜ ൅ ݎܽ௜                                            (15) 
The condition in (15) means that the regulator must set ௜ܵ൫ߠ௜, ߠ௝൯ sufficiently high to ensure 
that profit under the subsidy are larger than that without abatement goods. In fact, the condition 
in (15) is binding if we consider a small amount of a (positive) fixed subsidy in ௜ܵ൫ߠ௜, ߠ௝൯ ൅ ߝ. 
Then, the profit with abatement goods in (14) under the incentive subsidy scheme becomes the 
same profit without abatement goods in (12), i.e., ߨ௜൫ߠ௜; ߠ௝൯ ൌ ߨ௜ைሺߠ௜, ߠ௝). This implies that the 
same degree of ECSR without abatement goods in (13) can ensure that both firms engage in 
abatement technologies. 
In the fourth stage, the manager maximizes its objective function in (5). Then, the first order 
conditions with respect to the price of the final goods and the amount of abatement goods yield 
the following equilibrium outcomes: 
௜ܲ ∗ ൌ ஺ሺଵିఉሻା௥ଶିఉ                                                          (16) 
ܽ௜∗ ൌ ଶௗሺ஺ି௥ሻఏ೔ି௥൫ଶାఉିఉ
మ൯
ଶௗሺଶାఉିఉమሻఏ೔                                                    (17) 
Note that ܽ௜∗ ൐ 0 only when8 ߠ௜ ൐ ௥ሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻଶௗሺ஺ି௥ሻ ≡ ߠప෡ .  
In the third stage, the market clearing price is determined by the total demand and total supply, 
i.e., ܽா ൌ ∑ ܽ௜ଶ௜ୀଵ ൌ ∑ ܽ௘௠௘ୀଵ . Then, the inverse demand function of the abatement goods is: 
ݎሺܽாሻ ൌ ସ஺ௗఏభఏమሺଶାఉିఉమሻఏమାఏభሺଶାఉିఉమାସௗఏమሻ െ
ଶௗఏభఏమ൫ଶାఉିఉమ൯
ሺଶାఉିఉమሻఏమାఏభሺଶାఉିఉమାସௗఏమሻ ܽா                (18) 
This has a negative slope with total demand. Each eco-firm maximizes its profit with respect to 
its production of abatement goods, under the expectation of the market equilibrium condition, 
ܽா ൌ ∑ ܽ௘௠௘ୀଵ ൌ ݉ܽ௘. Then, we have the following equilibrium outcomes: 
                                          
8 When ߠ௜ ൌ ߠ௜ை , we have ݎ ൌ ஺ሺඥଵିఉమିሺଵିఉ
మሻሻ
ሺ௠ାଵሻሺඥଵିఉమାଵାఉሻ ൐ 0 and thus, ߠప෡ ൌ 0. It implies that we have a 
positive amount of abatement goods in the equilibrium outcomes. 
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ܽ௘∗ ൌ ଶ஺ሺଵା௠ሻሺଶାఉିఉమሻ                                                       (19) 
ܽ௜∗ ൌ ஺ሺ௠ିଵሻሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻఏೕା஺ఏ೔ሺሺଵା௠ሻሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻାସௗ௠ఏೕሻሺଵା௠ሻሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻఏೕାఏ೔ሺሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻାସௗఏೕሻሻ                            (20) 
ݎ∗ ൌ ସ஺ௗఏభఏమሺଵା௠ሻሺሺଶାఉିఉమሻఏమାఏభሺଶାఉିఉమାସௗఏమሻሻ                                         (21) 
Then, we have the following equilibrium outcomes in the third stage: 
௜ܲ ∗ ൌ ஺ሺଵିఉ
మାଶௗఏ೔ሻሺଶିఉିఉమାଶௗఏೕሻ
ସିହఉమାఉరାଶௗሺଶିఉమሻఏೕାଶௗఏ೔ሺଶିఉమାଶௗఏೕሻ                                  (22) 
ݍ௜∗ ൌ ஺൫ଶିఉିఉ
మାଶௗఏೕ൯
ସିହఉమାఉరାଶௗሺଶିఉమሻఏೕାଶௗఏ೔൫ଶିఉమାଶௗఏೕ൯                                    (23) 
Using the condition in (15), we obtain the incentive subsidy, and the profit function of the owner 
of the firm becomes that given in (12). It yields that the same degree of ECSR, i.e., 
ߠ௜∗ ൌ ߠ௜ை ൌ ඥଵିఉ
మିሺଵିఉమሻ
ଶௗ .  
Finally, we have the equilibrium outcomes for the subsidy on abatement technologies: 
௜ܲ ∗ ൌ ஺ሺሺଶିఉሻඥଵିఉ
మା௠ሺଵିఉሻሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻሻ
ሺଵା௠ሻሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻ  , ݍ௜∗ ൌ
஺ሺଶାఉିఉమା௠ሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻሻ
ሺଵା௠ሻሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻ  
ܽ௜∗ ൌ ஺௠ሺଵା௠ሻሺଶାఉିఉమሻ , ݎ∗ ൌ
஺ሺඥଵିఉమିሺଵିఉమሻሻ
ሺଵା௠ሻሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻ ,  
ߨ௜∗ ൌ ஺
మඥଵିఉమ
ሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻమ , ߨ௘∗ ൌ
ଶ஺మሺඥଵିఉమିሺଵିఉమሻሻ
ሺଵା௠ሻమሺଶାఉିఉమሻሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻ , 
ED∗ ൌ ݀ሺܳ െ ܽ௎ሻଶ ൌ ସ஺
మௗ
ሺଵା௠ሻమሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻమ  and 
ܹ∗ ൌ ஺మሺሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉାଶඥଵିఉమሻାଶ௠ሺଶିఉሻሺଷିఉమାሺଷିఉሻඥଵିఉమሻିସௗሺଶିఉሻమାଶ௠మሺଷିଶఉሻሺଵାඥଵିఉమሻሻሺଵା௠ሻమሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻమ   
Proposition 1. In the managerial delegation model with a government subsidy, voluntary ECSR 
reduces environmental damage, but increases the consumer surplus and total social welfare. 
Proof. From the comparisons, we have the following outcomes for	ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ	and	݉ ൒ 1:  
ݍ௜∗ െ ݍ௜ை ൌ ஺௠ሺඥଵିఉ
మିሺଵିఉమሻሻ
ሺଵା௠ሻሺଶିఉሻሺଵାఉሻሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻ ൐ 0	, ܽ௜∗ െ ܽ௜ை ൌ
஺௠
ሺଵା௠ሻሺଶାఉିఉమሻ ൐ 0 and  
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݁௜∗ െ ݁௜ை ൌ ି஺௠ሺଵା௠ሻሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻ ൏ 0. It implies that EDை െ ED∗ ൌ
ସ஺మௗ௠ሺଶା௠ሻ
ሺଵା௠ሻమሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻమ ൐ 0	and 
CS∗ െ CSை ൌ ஺మ௠ఉమሺଶሺଶିఉሻඥଵିఉమା௠ሺଵିఉାඥଵିఉమሺଷିఉሻሻሻሺଵା௠ሻమሺଶିఉሻమሺଵାඥଵିఉమሻሺଵାఉାඥଵିఉమሻమ ൐ 0. Therefore, we have 
ܹ∗ െܹை ൌ
஺మ௠൭ସௗሺଶା௠ሻሺଶିఉሻమାሺଵିఉሻቆଶሺଶିఉሻቀଵିඥଵିఉమቁା௠൬ଶାఉమିଶඥଵିఉమିଶఉቀଵିඥଵିఉమቁ൰ቇ൱
ሺଵା௠ሻమሺଶିఉሻమቀଵାఉାඥଵିఉమቁమ
൐ 0.  
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 1 states that subsidy-induced abatement technologies can produce more final goods, 
which yields a larger consumer surplus, and can reduce emissions, which yields less 
environmental damage. Hence, a welfare-improving alignment between private and social 
incentives is feasible, given an incentive subsidy scheme on voluntary self-regulation. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
We investigated Porter’s hypothesis in a managerial delegation contract and showed that a well-
designed subsidy scheme can enhance business profitability and thus, an environmental policy 
could lead to both social and private benefits. We found that a cost pass-through effect can 
increase consumer prices and the profitability of firms under corporate environmentalism. This 
analysis allows us to better understand the Porter’s trade-off between environmental policy and 
firm’s profitability. 
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